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[enm. No. 5809. In Bank. Feb. 24, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. ALFRED LEONZA BEARD,
Appellant.
[1) Searches and Seizures-Presumptions.-Where no evidence is

presented for the purpose of determining whether or not offieers had reasonable cause for making an arrest and searching
defendant's automobile, it must be presumed that the arrest
and search were justified.
[2) Arrest-Making Arrest.-Where the trial court found that
defendant was arrested while engaged in commission of the
offense charged, there was no violation of Pen. Code, § 841,
requiring the person making an arrest to inform the person
to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, the cause of
his arrest and the authority to make it, except when the person
to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or
attempt to commit an offense.

)

(1] See Oal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 21 et seq.
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 1; r2]
Arrest, §13; [3] Criminal Law, §970(4).
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[3] Oriminal Law-New 'l'rial-NewlJ Discovered Evidenee.-It
was not an abuse of discretion to deny defendant a new trial
on the ground of newly discovered evidence where there was
no showing that defendant's former attorney could not have
had a potential witness subpoenaed had his testimony been
wanted at the trial and no showing why another witness, who
lived near the scene of the arrest, could not be located and
subpoenaed or why the same investigation to locate her after
the trial would not have succeeded had reasonable diligence
been used earlier, and where neither defendant's nor his new
attorney's affidavit stated facts indicating that failure to
ob\.ain the evidence presented was owing to any lack of dili.
gence of the former attorney.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial.
Thomas L. Ambrose, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for illegal possession of marijuana. Judgment
of conviction affirmed.
Joseph H. Lewis and E. V. Cavanaugh for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James,
Marvin Gross and Joan D. Gross, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-By information defendant was charged
with one count of possessing marijuana (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11500), and one prior misdemeanor conviction of the same
ofi'ense. A jury trial was waived, and by stipulation the
prosecution's case was submitted on the transcript of the
preliminary hearing. Defendant testified in his own behalf.
He was found guilty and sentenced to the state prison for
the term prescribed by law. He appeals from the judgment
and from the order denying his motion for a new trial.
Officer Buckner of the Los Angeles Police Department
testified that shortly after noon on September 17, 1954, he
and another officer were driving north on Maple Avenue when
they observed defendant and a friend of his named Fortier
driving west on 29th Street. Defendant was driving. The
officers overshot 29th Street, went around the block and
came back on 29th Street approaching Maple Avenue from
the west. They observed defendant's car parked ahead of
them. Defendant and Fortier then started driving down the
street toward the officers' car, and when they had gone about
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half a block, the officers stopped them, got them out of the
car, and searched them and the car. A marijuana cigarette
was found under the left hand side of the front seat, and .
some brown cigarette paper was found in one of defendant's
pockets. Defendant then accused the officers of "planting
him." Officer Buckner also searched the area near the place
where defendant's ear had been parked, and inside a fence
found six marijuana cigarettes wrapped in wax paper.Defendant testified that he stopped for Fortier at his home
about 10 minutes before he was stopped by the officers. He
stopped again at 29th and Maple so that Fortier could buy
something at the corner, and defendant also got out of the
car to fix his foot pedal. He did not see the officers find a
cigarette in his car, and neither of them showed him the
cigarette that Officer Buckner testified was found in the ear,
and he did not know that there was any marijuana cigarette
in his car. He worked as a janitor and had left his ear open
on various occasions.
After he was found guilty, defendant secured new counsel
and moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. (Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. (8).) He presented
affidavits of Fortier and a person who lived near the scene
of the arrest, and each affiant stated that he had observed
the search of the car and that neitber officer had found a
marijuana cigarette in the car. He also filed an affidavit in
his own behalf stating that he was personally unable to secure
the evidence before the trial because he was in custody. His
new counsel filed an affidavit stating that he had no knowledge
as to why defendant's witnesses were not produced at his trial.
[1] Defendant contends that the officers did not have reasonable cause to believe that he had committed a felony and
that therefore his arrest and the search of his automobile
were illegal. This case was tried before the decision in People
v. Cahan, 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905], no evidence was
presented for the purpose of determining whether or not
the officers had reasonable cause for making an arrest, and
the record is completely silent on this question. In People v.
Farrara, ante, p. 265 [294 P.2d 21], we held that under
these circumstances it must be presumed that the arrest was
justified.
-The committing magistra.te refused to admit these eigarettes In
evidence on the ground that they had not been sufficiently connected with
defendant, and the trial court stated that he did not consider the testi·
mony of the officer eoncerning them in finding defendant guilty.

I

Feb. 1956]

PEOPLE tJ. BEARD
[.a C.1d 178: 294 P.1d 291

281

[2] Defendant also contends, however, that the oftice1'8
failed to comply with section 841 of the Penal Code and the
arrest was therefore unlawful. That section provides: "The
person making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest,
and the authority to make it, except when the person to ~
arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or an
attempt to commit an offense, or is pursued immediately after
its commission, or after an escape." The record is not clear
as to just what the officers .said to defendant at the time
of the arrest and search, and it may be conceded that there
is some evidence that they did not expressly inform him "of
the intention to arrest him, of the cause of the arrest, and
the authority to make it." Since the trial court found, however, that defendant was arrested while engaged in the commission of the offense, there was no violation of section 841.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.
Penal Code, section 1181, provides:
"When a verdict has been rendered or a finding made
against the defendant, the court may, upon his application,
grant a new trial, in the following cases only: . . .
"8. When new evidence is discovered material to the defendant, and which he ('ould not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial. . . . "
In People v. McGarry, 42 Ca1.2d 429, 432 [267 P.2d 254],
it was pointed out that a motion for a new trial is addressed
to the Bound discretion of the trial court, and that "The
elements of the standard by which a trial court in its discretion may properly grant a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence are set forth in People v. Sutton,
73 Cal. 243 [15 P. 86]. At page 247 it is stated that 'it must
appear,-eel. That the evidence, and not merely its materiality be newly discovered; 2. That the evidence be not
cumulative merely; 3. That it be such as to render a different
result probable on retrial of the cause; 4. That the party
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at the trial j and 5. That these facts be shown by
the best evidence of which the case admits." (1 Hayne on
New Trial and Appeal, § 88.)' More recent eases have turned
on a lack of one or more of the foregoing requirements, but
the over-all rules have withstood the test of time and properly
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state the existing law. (See PeopJe v. Rickard, 101 Cal.App.
2d 631, 635-636 [225 P.2d 938].)" (42 Cal.2d at 433.)
[3] In the light of the foregoing rules it cannot be said
that the trial court abused its discretion in this case. Thus,
Fortier was present in defendant's ear at the time of the
arrest and search and was also charged with a violation of
Health and Safety Code, section 11500, which charge was
dismissed at the preliminary hearing. Obviously defendant
was aware that Fortier was a potential witness, and it is not
claimed that his former attorney could not have had him
subpoenaed had his testimony been wanted at the trial.
Similarly there is no showing as to why the other witness
could not be located and subpoenaed. She lived near the
scene of the arrest, and the trial court could reasonably infer
from the fact that she was close enough to observe the search,
that defendant was aware of her presence at the time. Although, while he was in custody, defendant could not personally locate this witness, there is no showing why the same
investigation made to locate her after the trial would not
have succeeded had reasonable diligence been used earlier.
Moreover, although defendant now contends that he should
not be penalized for any lack of diligence on the part of
his former attorney, neither his nor his present attorney's
affidavit states facts indicating that the failure to obtain the
evidence now presented was owing to any l.ck of diligence
of the former attorney. Defendant does not state that he
informed his former attorney that bystanders witnessed the
search, that he requested that she attempt to locate such
witnesses, or that she refused to make any attempt to secure
witnesses in his behalf. Under these circumstances the trial
court could reasonably conclude that defendant had not shown
that the decision to rely solely on his own testimony was
other than his own, or that the evidence now presented was
evidence "which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial." (Pen. Code, § 1181,
subd. (8).)
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
concurred.
Shenk, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
Since the facts of this case with respect to the reasonableness of the search are quite similar to those in the case of
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People v. Martin, Crim. 5758, ante, p. 106 [293 P.2d 52].
I refer to my dissent in that case as an expression of my
views on the law applicable to the case at bar.
There is another reason why I would reverse the judgment
in the case at bar which is not mentioned in my dissent in
the Martin cast', supra. As pointed out in the majority opinion
in the case at bar, this case was tried before the decision
of this court in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434[282 P.2d
905], and therefore the trial court did not have before it
or take into consideration the rule announced in the Caban
case with respect to the admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence. Neither did the trial court have occasion to pass
upon the reasonableness of the search and seizure as this
factor was not considered material under the rule and practice which existed prior to the decision of this court in the
Caban case. For this reason we do not have the benefit of
the finding of the trial court on the question of whether or
not the officers who conducted the search here had reasonable
cause to believe that defendant had committed a felony or
was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of
the search. Wbileit is my opinion, that on the record before
us, no reasonable cause is shown for the search of the defendant, and it must therefore be declared to be an illegal
search, it may be that if the case against the defendant was
being prosecuted in the light of what was said by this court
in the Caban case and cases which have followed that ease,
the prosecution would no doubt offer any evidence available
for the purpose of showing the reasonableness of the search
and the trial court would necessarily make a finding on this
issue in ruling on the admissibility of the evidence obtained
as the result of the search. If there was a conflict in the
evidence on this issue, we would be bound by the finding
of the trial court the same as we should be bound by such a
finding in any other case.
I can see no justification whatsoever for the holding of
the majority in this case that the evidence as a matter of
law shows that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe
that defendant had committed or was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time they made the search and
seizure here involved, but on the contrary it appears from
the face of the record that the only conclusion that can be
drawn is that the officers had no cause whatever to believe
defendant had committed or was engaged in the commission
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of a felony and therefore the search and seizure was illegal
and the evidence obtained thereby should be held inadmissible
under the rule in the Cahan case.
I would therefore reverse the judgment and remand the
case for a new trial so that the trial court would have an
opportunity to pass upon the reasonableness of the search
in view of the evidence which might then be presented in the
light of the decision of this court in the Cahan case and other
cases involving this same subject matter since the decision
of this court in the Cahan case.

